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# Intelligence Report

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Office of Intelligence Research

## SOVIET ADJUSTMENTS TO STALIN'S DEATH

### PART I. GENERAL IMPLICATIONS

The government and Party reorganization effected in the Soviet Union on the morrow of Stalin's death was clearly designed to insure an orderly transfer of power and to prepare against any domestic or foreign eventuality.

The reorganization was striking for its speed, thoroughness, and orderliness. It involved a concentration of both power and operational responsibility in the hands of a key group in the old Politburo in a manner reminiscent of emergency measures taken during World War II.

The actions taken, the tone and content of the official announcements, and the accompanying commentaries demonstrate that the Soviet leaders are intent upon giving an appearance of unity regardless of any personal rivalries that may exist among them. To the rank and file of the Soviet Party, to the masses of the Russian peoples, to the satellite regimes, to the leaders of foreign Parties, and to presumed foreign enemies, the regime has presented what is made to seem an unbreakable front and one that is capable of meeting any situation that may arise. Moreover, the new set-up seems especially designed to leave no question as to rigid continuity. Faces have been rearranged, but no new ones have made an appearance and none that has been at the forefront has been suddenly dropped.

The physical void left by Stalin's elimination appears thus to have been filled, at least for the time being.

Steps have also been taken to fill the spiritual void. Evidently recognizing the impossibility of effecting an early substitution of any individual for Stalin as the personal embodiment of the Soviet-Communist world, the regime has attempted to reestablish the symbolic importance of the Soviet Party itself. This process began in fact with the first announcement of Stalin's collapse and has continued without let-up since.

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In the realignment of top government and Party organs, Georgi M. Malenkov emerged in the Number One position. Already ranking Party Secretary after Stalin's death, Malenkov assumed Stalin's post as Premier or Chairman of the Council of Ministers and headed the membership list of the reconstituted Party Presidium, the renamed Politburo.

Malenkov worked closely with Stalin from the mid-1920's, first as his personal secretary and then as his supervisor of Party personnel matters. He is known as an administrator and an industrial efficiency expert. He has avoided any independent theoretical pronouncements, having only paraphrased Stalin in such doctrinal statements as he has been called upon to make. Malenkov's attitude toward the West was probably reflected in his speech in 1949 at the November anniversary, which was the most intransigent statement made on the occasion in the postwar period. Like most top Soviet leaders he has never been outside the Soviet bloc.

While Malenkov's position as Number One cannot be doubted, he has not so far taken over the full measure of power that was Stalin's. This he evidently shares with some five fellow members of the old Politburo: Beriya, Bulganin, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Khrushchev. The first four of these not only hold membership in the new ten-member Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party, but as "First Deputy Chairmen" of the Council of Ministers constitute with Malenkov the "presidium" of the Council of Ministers, the supreme executive body of the state. All except Kaganovich head key ministries. Khrushchev, while holding no government post, appears to have been given the leading position, after Malenkov, in Party affairs.

Of these five, Beriya, particularly, and Bulganin and Khrushchev appear to be in the forefront. By virtue of their positions, they personally command key areas of power. Within the new five-man Presidium of the Council of Ministers, Beriya has resumed leadership of security forces (again joined together in a single agency) and Bulganin has again taken personal charge of the war ministry. Meanwhile Khrushchev has been relieved of local Party duties in order to concentrate completely on the over-all Party situation, a designation that means he will share the immediate direction of various Party matters with Malenkov.

The extent of Malenkov's power will rest in part on how successfully he has utilized his long association with personnel matters within the Party. Although a ministry may be under the personal direction of another Presidium member, it may actually respond to Malenkov, in the event of any show-down, if an adequate number of its top officials consider themselves personally indebted to Malenkov for their rise and thus accord him their personal loyalty.

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The changes in the Government and Party showed these additional trends:

(1) Junior Politburo members are moving to the fore. In the five-man Presidium of the Council of Ministers, three members did not receive full Politburo status until 1946, although they admittedly carried heavy responsibilities during the war. They are Malenkov, (51 in January), Beriya (54 on March 29), and Bulganin (57).

(2) Senior Politburo members have been edged downward. Molotov (63 on March 9) gave up his long-held second position in top Party listings to Beriya. Although third in order on both the Government and Party presidiums, his responsibility for foreign affairs does not afford him a power apparatus within the Soviet Union. So long as Stalin lived, Molotov benefited from his long association with the leader. With Stalin dead, he appears to have dropped somewhat. If his responsibilities should entail relations with Communist China and the satellites, however, his prestige would be enhanced. Voroshilov, at 71 the oldest Politburo member and, like Molotov, a personal friend of Stalin since the Revolution, has been given the honorary position of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, legislature of the USSR. Since Soviet law provides that a minister cannot serve on this Presidium, Voroshilov holds no executive post in the government. He replaces Shvernik (64 or 65) who returns to his old job as head of the trade unions and who was dropped in the Party presidium to the alternate level. Kaganovich, nearing 60, is the fifth member of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. He does not have an assigned ministerial responsibility and will probably be charged with direction of economic affairs.

(3) Power generally is being more closely concentrated. Top party and government organs have been reduced in number and in size. The Presidium of the Council of Ministers has been limited to five members. The Presidium of the Party's Central Committee, recently raised to 36 members including 11 candidates at the XIX Party Congress, has been pared to 14 members, including four candidates. The bureaus of both the Government and Party presidium have been abolished. Important government ministries have been merged into single agencies. These various steps are similar to those taken just before and during World War II. Politburo members have taken over direct control of the ministries, reversing the trend since 1946. Organization of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers as a small top directing body recalls the establishment of the five-man State Defense Committee in 1941. Announcement of the office of first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers harks back to the creation of this rank in the spring of 1941. The reappearance of Marshal Zhukov, who except for one brief period in 1951 has been largely out of the public eye recalls the public attention given to military figures in 1941.

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Despite the extensive realignment of personalities, it appears most unlikely that any new policy grouping has emerged. It is in fact uncertain whether significant policy differences actually exist among top Soviet leaders. Where such have been reported, they have invariably been based upon speculation. Even in the speculative reports, however, the five top leaders of the moment have never been placed together in a single policy group. Rather they have invariably been split into rival groups. As a matter of fact the personalities now in control represent a cross section of those who have dominated the Soviet scene for the past thirty years. The group, small as it is, includes individuals who could be considered as falling into each of the "interest groups" ordinarily assumed to exist in the Soviet hierarchy; i.e., government, Party, military, production, Old Bolsheviks, Young Bolsheviks, etc. If policies of recent years reflected any one's thinking other than Stalin's, then the newly established masters must have contributed to their formulation. On the basis of existing evidence, for Malenkov and his associates to advocate a new policy line in either the foreign or domestic field would be to repudiate themselves and all they have stood for.

The nature of the reorganization measures, as well as the manner in which they have been adopted and promulgated, leave no doubt of keen awareness on the part of those now in charge of the Soviet Union of the dangers inherent in a transfer of Stalin's power. Moreover there appears to be a firm resolve on the part of the leaders to subordinate, for the time being at least, all other considerations to that of safeguarding against these dangers.

It consequently seems most unlikely that for at least the short run the Soviet power structure will be beset by either paralysis, confusion or internal conflict. Whether this will remain the case after an orderly transition has been effected is, of course, conjectural. Certainly all the elements requisite for a more or less explosive power struggle will remain present for some time. The sharing of power that circumstances have apparently forced upon Malenkov leaves the way open for a serious challenge of his position by one or more of his associates, particularly by those who enjoy direct authority over a power base (Beriya, Khrushchev, and Bulganin). Also, since this sharing process leaves Malenkov's power position incomplete, it will inevitably keep him under greater or lesser pressure to encroach on the prerogatives of these associates. Only in this way can he finally secure his hold on power. While a successful extension of Malenkov's authority would, of course, increase stability, premature or unskillful efforts along these lines might provoke a strong reaction on the part of those whose positions were being threatened and thus jeopardize the regime.

It should be noted, however, that the situation generally is far more conducive to stability than it was at Lenin's death. When Lenin died, there existed within the Party well defined and long established

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antagonistic power groupings. Division also still reached deep into the population. The long incapacity of Lenin had made for intrigue. More significantly, Lenin's preeminence was due to the force of his influence and not to his exercise of certain functions the taking over of which would automatically carry with it the leading role.

Even granting these differences, however, in the final analysis the fate of the new set-up will depend upon Malenkov's own ability. Malenkov's apparent position is far stronger than was that of Stalin in 1924. Assuming skill and resolution on his part, he should be able to make himself master of the situation. Malenkov's experience, personality and capabilities appear, therefore, key to the problem of future prospects. While little firm information about these is available, what there is suggests that his hold on power, like Stalin's, will increase rather than slacken.

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TOP-LEVEL SOVIET POLITICAL STRUCTURE

MINISTRIES  
(ALL DEPUTY CHAIRMEN OF  
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS)

PRESIDIUM OF THE  
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

PARTY  
PRESIDIUM

PARTY  
SECRETARIAT

OTHER

MALENKOV

MALENKOV-Chairman

MALENKOV

BERIYA

First Deputy Chairman  
BERIYA

BERIYA-Internal Affairs

MOLOTOV

MOLOTOV

MOLOTOV-Foreign Affairs

VOROSHILOV

VOROSHILOV  
Chairman,  
Presidium of  
USSR Supreme  
Soviet

KHRUSHCHEV

KHRUSHCHEV

BULGANIN

BULGANIN

BULGANIN-War

KAGANOVICH

KAGANOVICH

MIKOYAN

MIKOYAN-Trade

SABUROV

SABUROV-Machine-building

PERVUKHIN

PERVUKHIN-Power Industry

Candidate members

Shvernik

Shvernik

Ponomarenko

Ponomarenko-Agricultural  
Procurement

Chairman,  
Presidium of  
Trade Unions  
1st Party Secretaries

Melnikov

Melnikov-Ukraine

Bagirov

Bagirov-Azerbaijan

Mikhailov

Mikhailov-Moscow

Ignatiev

Pospelov

Shatalin

Aristov

Suslov

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PART II: MALENKOV THE MANCareer

Malenkov was close to Stalin from the 1920's. Although employed in many undertakings, his principal concern has consistently been determining the assignments of party personnel, a useful position, as Stalin found, in which to build up a personal political machine.

Born in Chkalov in 1902, Malenkov volunteered for duty in the Red Army at the age of 17 and from 1919 to 1922 served as a political commissar in Central Asia where campaigns were being waged to crush the local nationalist resistance to the Bolsheviks.

Following Soviet victory in Central Asia, Malenkov, like many young Communists, was sent to an engineering school in Moscow for training to help replace the Tsarist specialists who still provided most of the technical skill. His career in the Central Committee apparatus started as soon as he left school in 1925, and the "responsible" work that he engaged in until 1930 was apparently service in Stalin's personal secretariat, which after 1928 was officially designated as the Special Sector of the Central Committee's Secretariat.

Malenkov's work with Party cadres began in 1930 and in a few years expanded to cover assignment of workers in all fields. His first task was in the Moscow Party organization where, as head of the Organizational Section, he aided Kaganovich in intensifying the purge of the opposition to Stalin. In 1934 during a reorganization of the Central Committee apparatus he became chief of the newly-formed Section of Leading Party Organs. In this position he supervised the work of the Party machine during the vital purge years and directed the assignment of Communists first to posts in the Party machine, then after 1937 to posts in all fields. His rising stature in the Communist Party was signaled in 1935 when he became a junior member of the Liquidation Commission for the Society of Old Bolsheviks under Andreyev and Shkiryatov. About this time he became editor of the Party's periodical Party Construction (since abolished) which concentrated on organizational matters. The expulsion of about two-thirds of the Party's members after 1932 cleared the way for Malenkov's rise to new positions of power in 1939. He became the head of the newly-organized Cadres Administration, which controlled all Party personnel, and was added to both the Secretariat and the Orgburo at this time.

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On the eve of the German attack in 1941, Malenkov became an alternate member of the Politburo, which gave official recognition to the powers he already wielded. He remained in charge of the Cadres Administration at least until 1948, Soviet sources indicate, and became a full member of the Politburo in March 1946 while retaining membership in the two other top Party bodies. Soviet sources suggest that he did not function as a Party Secretary from May 1946 to July 1948.

After the German invasion Malenkov's high position in the Soviet power set-up was signified by his inclusion in the original five-man all-powerful State Defense Committee. The original group consisted of Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, and Beriya; later additions were Voznesenski, Mikoyan, Bulganin replacing Voroshilov, and Kaganovich. An indication of his crucial role during this period is the decoration that he received in 1943 for increasing aircraft production. As late as 1947, Malenkov was still reported to be in charge of the aircraft industry. In 1943 Malenkov actually received a post of command over other members of the Politburo, although he was officially only an alternate member of that body. He was appointed head of the Committee for Restoration of the Economy in Areas Liberated from the German occupation. Members under Malenkov were Beriya, Mikoyan, Voznesenski, and Andreyev.

Except for these emergency situations, Malenkov's role in the government has been comparatively small. He was elected to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1938, a nominal position that he appears to have retained until 1946. He became a Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (now Council of Ministers) some time before November 1944. He was not reappointed when a new government was formed in March 1946, but a few months later he again received the post. The election campaign biographies of this period described Malenkov as busy restoring the economy in liberated areas; a year later similar sources said that he had been "directly" engaged in agricultural work.

His opportunity to regain his former prominence in Party work came in the summer of 1948 when, following Tito's defection, he again became active as a Secretary of the Central Committee. He simultaneously retained his post as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, thereby becoming the first man other than Stalin to work in both bodies. During the past five years Malenkov seems to have steadily improved his position among those close to Stalin. In 1949 he gave the speech at the anniversary celebration of the October Revolution. At the 19th Party Congress in October 1952, he delivered the Central Committee's report which traditionally had been given by Stalin.

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Personality

Malenkov is one of the Soviet leaders about whom comparatively little is known. Since he first became prominent in 1941 he has delivered few speeches, and has had almost no contact with non-Communist foreigners. Nevertheless, a careful reading of his public utterances plus other fragmentary data provide certain clues to his ideas and personality.

Malenkov is quite obviously a person of great energy and efficiency. His ability to handle the complex affairs of the Soviet state is attested to by the wide variety of tasks which he has successfully carried out in the past. A good example of his businesslike approach to administrative problems was provided by his speech on industry and transport to the 1941 Party Conference. This address gave a devastating criticism of defects in the operation of these branches of the economy and provided instructions for increasing the control of the Party over their operations.

Malenkov's rise to power has been favored by an apparent ability to size up a situation and to present his views forcefully. His speeches are simple, clear, show considerable skill in summarizing the salient aspects of a problem, and present the solution in unequivocal terms. He appears to have much intolerance toward graft and corruption, and does not hesitate to describe as criminal any activity which he does not consider proper. Malenkov has apparently little use for theoretical discussions. His speeches are notably free from theoretical propositions, although when necessary he usually quotes from either Stalin or Lenin. There is even evident a certain scorn of the administrator for theorists who hamper the execution of planned programs or policy. Thus Malenkov declared in 1946:

Among us there are some people who have for every situation and occasion a ready quotation from Marx and Engels. Instead of taking the trouble to comprehend what is new and study the experience, they have one answer: 'No. This cannot be found in Marx's works,' or 'Engels said differently.' Yet Marx, if he were able to get up from his grave and see such a follower, excuse me for calling him so, he undoubtedly would not hesitate to disavow him.

In addition to demanding absolute loyalty from his subordinates, Malenkov constantly stresses efficiency. Again the administrator's approach to the problems of state is apparent. He declared, for example, in 1941:

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Among non-Party people there are many honest and good workers who, although not belonging to the Party and having no record of long time Party membership, work better and more conscientiously than some Communists with a long membership duration.

His speeches, particularly the most recent one delivered at the 19th Party Congress, display considerable impatience with the ways of bureaucracy. At this time he declared:

The bureaucratic attitude to the control over implementation of decisions must not be tolerated. It is necessary that one should not be afraid to repeal or adjust a decision made, if its erroneous-ness or inexactitude has been revealed.

Malenkov is reportedly a good speaker. His two electoral addresses in 1946 and 1950 on the occasion of his nomination to the Supreme Soviet have elements of popular appeal and seem to emphasize points to which the audience can respond, particularly nationalism. Nevertheless he appears to stand aloof not only from the populace but also from his subordinates and co-workers. There is no evidence of his having formed close friendships with any of the other leading Soviet figures, although he has formed successful working partnerships. What is known of Malenkov suggests that he is an opportunist, and can be quite unscrupulous in a struggle for power.

#### Relations with Associates

Although Malenkov is little known to the Soviet public as a whole, he seems to have acquired a distinct reputation among Party leaders. The top three or four thousand men in positions of authority in the Soviet Union probably have considerable respect for him; one high Party official is reported to have remarked: "It was Russia's good fortune that Stalin has chosen this man." Although he is no doubt respected for his ability to get ahead and to exercise strong control through strict discipline, he must also be feared by those beneath him. Party officials have found that the absolute loyalty he demands is repaid by positions of authority, and that those who oppose him, as Voznesenski is alleged to have done, may fall rapidly from positions of prominence. While evidence on Malenkov's associations and relationships within the leading group is scattered and of questionable reliability, there are indications that he has placed his supporters in at least some key positions and has cultivated the support of other powerful individuals.

L. P. Beriia. L. P. Beriia has been associated with Malenkov since 1938, when he took over Yezhov's post as head of the NKVD. Malenkov

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was head of the Section of Leading Party Cadres, which cooperated closely with the NKVD during the purges. Although Malenkov was closely associated with Yezhov, he was not involved in the latter's fall from power. Experience in the use of secret police and the mechanism of terror has taught him the importance of close cooperation between the Party organs and the police. Beriya and Malenkov rose to power almost simultaneously, became full members of the Politburo together in 1946, and are rumored to hold similar views on questions of general policy. Beriya usually sits with Malenkov at sessions of the Supreme Soviet. Although this appears to be a working partnership rather than a personal friendship, their close cooperation in the past may continue for some time in the future.

V. M. Molotov. On the other hand, Molotov has never been a close associate of Malenkov's. There are reports that Malenkov's first wife, whom he divorced in 1940, had been one of Molotov's secretaries, but the two men have not been closely associated either before or since Malenkov joined the inner circle of the Soviet rulers. Molotov, who has had long associations with the top ranks of Party leadership, particularly with Stalin, may have long regarded Malenkov as an upstart. The possibility that Molotov supported Zhdanov in his presumed rivalry with Malenkov, which resulted in Malenkov's lessened political stature from 1946-48, may render his position precarious if Malenkov consolidates his control over the Party and government.

L. M. Kaganovich. Before he joined the Party in 1920, Malenkov served with the Red Army on the Turkestan front during the Civil War. L. M. Kaganovich was at that time a member of the Turkmen bureau of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. As Malenkov's work in the army was in the political section of a cavalry unit, he may have come to Kaganovich's attention at that time. In 1930, when Kaganovich was appointed secretary of the Moscow Party organization, Malenkov became head of the organization section under him. Their purpose was to eliminate dissident elements, particularly followers of Bukharin from the Moscow organization. It may be assumed that they formed an effective working partnership, as they have often cooperated since. After the war Kaganovich and Malenkov reportedly worked together on administrative reforms within the Party directed toward increasing Party discipline.

Subordinates. Due to Malenkov's ability to choose subordinates who are loyal to him, supporters on whom he may depend seem to be now in strategic Party and government posts. N. S. Krushchev, who is listed

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fifth on the new presidium of the Central Committee worked under Malenkov when he was in charge of reconstructing the areas reconquered by the Red Army. They are reportedly on very good terms. Malenkov's other key subordinates at that time were P. K. Ponomarenko, now a candidate of the Presidium and a "leading member" of the Council of Ministers, and M. A. Suslov, who remains a secretary of the Central Committee. N. A. Shatalin, now on the secretariat of the Central Committee, worked with Malenkov on the Organizational Bureau of the Party since 1939, as well as on several other organs. M. F. Shkiryatov, who probably still remains chairman of the Party Control Commission, worked with Malenkov on the Commission for the Disposal of the Assets of the Society of the Old Bolsheviks, which was appointed in May 1935.

Some of Malenkov's known supporters have not received key posts as a result of the recent shifts in position; if Malenkov extends his control they may become more prominent. Among them is V. M. Andrianov, who worked with Malenkov and Shatalin on the Organizational Bureau after 1939. Shvernik, although an older man who appears to have lost prestige in the recent shuffle of positions, is reportedly favorable to Malenkov.

#### Position on Internal Policy

Malenkov's known views on internal affairs and his long and close association with Stalin suggest that there will be little change in the direction of internal policy. There will undoubtedly be emphasis on efficiency and high ethical standards for public service. There will possibly be more severe punishment for those found guilty of violating Soviet laws. His previous lack of attention to theoretical problems cannot be taken as a sign of the abandonment or modification of any of the basic propositions of Soviet ideology. As in Stalin's case, however, the fate of an individual will probably be determined more on the basis of his proved value to Malenkov, the Party, and the state than on proficiency in interpreting Marxist principles.

There seems to be no question that Malenkov will uphold the principle of Party supremacy in the Soviet state, since this has been so instrumental in succession to and retention of power. The role of the police seems, however, to have assumed greater importance with the advance of Beriya to a position directly below that of Malenkov. It is possible that Malenkov will put even greater reliance on the police than has been the case in the past and that police authority will be used even more extensively to insure efficient operation of the state.

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### Position on Foreign Policy

Malenkov's concern with foreign affairs, at least until his report to the 19th Party Congress, has been limited to participation in the direction of activities of foreign Communists. Gouzenko stated in 1946 at the Canadian spy hearings that Malenkov was in charge of the Foreign Section of the Central Committee and this is borne out both by Malenkov's appearance at Cominform meetings and by intelligence reports of various foreign Communists visiting him in the USSR on official business.

In his public utterances which have touched on foreign policy, Malenkov has closely parroted the line laid down by Stalin. An insight into his attitude on this question is supplied by his electoral speech in 1946:

It is no secret that even our friends respect us because we are strong. And it must always be remembered that friends will respect us only as long as we are strong....We do not want to pull chestnuts out of the fire for others. If there are any chestnuts available we will use them for the good of our glorious Soviet people.

Judging by his speeches, Malenkov's attitude toward the United States is one of considerable hostility. His attacks on US policy throughout the world reflect the customary dogmatic assertions of Soviet leaders regarding US intentions. Malenkov's statements on this subject do not, however, approach the raving propaganda of Pospelov. They are always carefully buttressed by alleged facts, especially economic statistics, a device which probably induces a high degree of credibility among his audience. On the other hand, some of Malenkov's attacks on the camp of imperialism, whether by conscious intent or dramatic style, include more vivid, emotionally-charged figures of speech than are found in those leveled by Molotov. Malenkov used in his 1949 anniversary speech, for example, such phrases as "followers of the fascist barbarians," "bloody hand of a new war," "mad plans," and "direct preparation of a new imperialist war." These statements were not employed either by Zhdanov or Molotov in their earlier addresses on the November 7 occasion. Nor did the latter go out of their way, as Malenkov did in 1949, to declare that:

What is the difference between the crazy plans of this sort to Americanize all countries and Continents and the mad plan of Hitler-Goering for the

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Germanization of first Europe and the whole world? What is the difference between this program and the no less mad plans of Tanaka-Tojo to subjugate the whole of Asia and the Pacific basin to Japanese imperialists? In fact the only difference lies in the fact that the aggressive program of the new warmongers surpasses the plans of their German and Japanese predecessors taken together.

In his four major postwar speeches, Malenkov has mentioned the theme of peaceful coexistence of the USSR and capitalist states, although with differing emphasis. In his Cominform speech in 1947, he declared that the USSR recognized the "fact of inevitability of coexistence for a long period of time..." and stated its willingness to maintain neighborly relations with the outer world. In his November 1949 speech, this theme received scant attention, other than the statement that "the Soviet people do not fear peaceful competition with capitalism." In his eulogy of Stalin on the latter's 70th birthday, however, much was made of the possibility of coexistence and Stalin's interviews were quoted at considerable length. His most recent speech, at the 19th Party Congress reiterated the previous position. He said at that time:

The USSR is also today prepared to collaborate with these [capitalist] states, having in mind the adherence to peaceful international norms and the safeguarding of a lasting and stable peace.

Malenkov's attitude toward a new World War reflects the official stand of the Soviet Government. He stated, for example, twice in his 1949 speech that "We do not want war and will do everything possible to avoid it."

In discussing this subject, however, Malenkov's principal emphasis has been on the capability of the Soviet Union to handle successfully any eventuality that might arise, and on the "certainty" that any new war would end in the death of capitalism. Whether by assignment or on his own initiative, Malenkov at the 19th Party Congress offset in large measure the implication contained in Stalin's just published Bolshevik article that war was more likely to break out among capitalist states than between the capitalist and socialist worlds. In the foreign policy section of his report he concentrated attention on alleged US-British plans and preparations for a war against the Soviet bloc. He gave only passing notice to the inter-capitalist war possibility, saying merely that it should not be forgotten that a war between the capitalist and socialist camps was not the only war that could occur.

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SECURITY INFORMATIONPART III. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF REORGANIZATION MEASURESParty Changes

The Party changes so far announced both reduced the membership and reorganized the structure of the top Party organs -- the Presidium and Secretariat. The membership of the former has been reduced from the 36 members, including 11 candidates, elected following the 1952 Party Congress to 14, including four candidates. The Secretariat now apparently has eight instead of the 10 members elected in 1952. The "Buro" of the Presidium, for which no provision was made in the revised Party statutes adopted last year, has been abolished.

The new Presidium has essentially reconstituted the old Politburo. Of the eleven surviving Politburo members, nine -- Malenkov, Beriya, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, and Shvernik -- have been appointed to the Presidium, only Andreyev and Kosygin, who were demoted at the 1952 Congress, have not been included. Shvernik has been returned to his position as a candidate member which he held prior to his elevation as a full member of the Presidium at the Party Congress. The five non-Politburo members in the new Presidium are Saburov and Pervukhin, elected as full members, and candidates Ponomarenko, Melnikov, and Bagirov. The first four had all been elected full members of the Presidium last year, while Bagirov is a total newcomer to the body. Saburov has been identified intermittently since 1938 with state planning while Pervukhin has headed at various times since 1939 the electric power, fuel and chemical industries. Ponomarenko, Melnikov, and Bagirov have been identified primarily as Party officials. Ponomarenko had been a secretary of the Belorussian Party organization, 1938-47, and from 1948 a secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. Recently he has also been Minister of Agricultural Procurement. Melnikov, after service in the commissariat of state control, worked as a Party secretary in the Ukraine from 1945, and since 1949 has headed the Ukrainian Party organization. Bagirov has headed the Azerbaïdzhan Party organization since 1933, and at least during the last four years has been especially active in stressing the contributions of the Great Russians to the welfare of the Soviet minorities.

Only half of the 10 members elected to the Secretariat in 1952 apparently remain in their posts -- Malenkov, Khrushchev, Aristov, Mikhailov, and Suslov, though the decree mentioned neither Aristov nor Suslov. The four other surviving secretaries -- Ponomarenko, Pegov, Brezhnev and Ignatov -- were relieved of their posts in connection with assignment to other duties. Three new members -- Ignatiev, Pospelov, and Shatalin -- were added. Ignatiev has been identified with Party work since the pre-war period, chiefly in minority areas, and has been sent by Moscow to trouble spots, first to Belorussia in 1947 and then to Uzbekistan in 1950. There is some evidence that recently he had been in

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charge of the state security forces which in January 1953 were criticized for laxness while under Ignatiev's predecessors. Pospelov is a theoretician and journalist who has long been one of the editors of the Party's chief periodical Kommunist (formerly Bolshevik), chief editor of Pravda until 1949 and deputy editor since the end of 1952. Between 1949 and 1952 he headed the Party's Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, which is responsible for research on the writings of the Bolshevik mentors. Shatalin, elected as a member of the old Orgburo in 1946, which was abolished along with the Politburo last year, has worked in the Central Committee's apparatus and in 1950 was sent to Moldavia from Moscow to supervise the reorganization of the local Party machine.

The abolition of the Buro of the Party's Presidium realigns the top Party structure in accordance with the provisions of the revised Party statutes. No provision had been made in the statutes for the Buro, although the size of the old Presidium and the distinctive treatment given last November to its members who had been on the Politburo suggested that an inner group had been established. It is likely that most of the members of the Buro have been retained in the new Presidium and, in effect, only a name change has thus taken place.

The release of Khrushchev from his Moscow Oblast Party post "to concentrate on his work in the Central Committee" suggests that hereafter he will supervise the daily operations of the Party and probably will have the same opportunities as Malenkov had under Stalin to staff the Party machinery with his followers. Malenkov and Khrushchev are now the only two persons who are members of both the Presidium and the Secretariat. This makes them, in effect, the top Party bosses. Again, it would appear that the Party has restored the practice, in effect until October 1952, of having no more than three persons occupying positions simultaneously in the highest Party bodies -- the Politburo (or Presidium) and the Secretariat.

Government Changes

Reorganization of the governmental apparatus chiefly affected the principal administrative agency, the Council of Ministers, and the ministries subordinated to it. Of the two organs of the Council of Ministers, the Presidium and the Bureau of that Presidium, the latter was abolished entirely, and membership in the Presidium was limited to the chairman and "first deputy chairmen" of the Council. The same decree named only five persons to these posts -- Malenkov as chairman, and Beriya, Molotov, Bulganin and Kaganovich as first deputy chairmen -- thus concentrating control of the governmental apparatus in the hands of a very few from the Party's inner circle. The personalities forming the Presidium are nearly the same as those of the State Defense Committee, supreme body in the USSR during the war, and identical to the 1944 composition of the Committee except for Stalin, Voznesenski, who disappeared in 1949, and Mikoyan.

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The significance of the abolition of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers and the probable reduction in size of the Presidium is not clear since the existence of the Presidium was hitherto unknown. It was known that a Bureau, created in May 1944, existed within the Council for the "examination and verification in the name of the Council of People's Commissars of production, supply, and financial plans of all branches of the economy, and also the solution of practical problems of the work of People's Commissariats, committees, administrations, etc. in the Council of People's Commissars." The composition of the Bureau was not known. It appears that the Bureau was replaced by a Presidium after March 1951, perhaps at the time of the 19th Party Congress last October. It is possible that it consisted of all the Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers, and that the Bureau within it was composed of familiar Politburo members.

Although the only sub-organ of the Council is now the five-man Presidium, the title "First Deputy Chairman" given to four of its members clearly implies that other deputy chairmen still exist. Thus there still exists one stratum between the Presidium and simple membership on the Council, whether or not it has a name. But it is clearly the intent of the decree to assert the primacy in governmental affairs for the time being, at least, of a small group of Party leaders.

Ministerial consolidations reduced the total number of ministries from 51 to 42. Groups of ministries connected with a single broad and important sector of the nation's activities were merged and placed under the direct control of strong Party leaders, who are, with one exception, members of the new Party Presidium. The merger of the Ministry of State Security (MGB) with the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), with Beriya as Minister, placed all police organs in the hands of the same man who had headed them from 1938-1943, and who retained the MVD post -- after MGB was separated -- until 1946. The reassumption by Beriya of the police post adds weight to the belief that he has been the Politburo member concerned with overall supervision of police activities. Beriya's deputies were not named. Molotov was returned to the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs which he had held from 1939-1949. The former Foreign Minister, Andrei Vyshinski was named one of the two First Deputy Ministers and permanent representative to the UN. The other First Deputy Minister named was Yakob Malik. V. V. Kuznetsov, former member of Party Presidium and Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, was also named a Deputy Minister.

Marshal Bulganin was named to head the War Ministry, a position he held from 1947-1949. The former War Minister, Marshal A. M. Vasilevski, remained as one of the First Deputy Ministers. The other First Deputy is famed Marshal G. K. Zhukov, who has been in semi-eclipse since 1946.

The Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Foreign Trade were merged into a Ministry of Internal and External Trade, headed by Mikoyan.

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Mikoyan had headed a ministry of the same name from 1926-1930, and from 1930-49 headed Soviet departments in charge of either domestic or foreign commerce. Even after his relinquishment of a direct administrative post he was generally considered the Politburo member having overall supervision of trade problems. I. G. Kabanov, recently identified as Chairman of the State Committee for the Material-Technical Supply of the Economy (Gossnab), was named First Deputy Minister. The former Ministers of Trade and Foreign Trade, V. G. Zhavoronkov and P. N. Kunykin, remained as Deputy Ministers.

Virtually all construction of machinery, including ships and locomotives, but not including airplanes or armaments, previously carried on by eight ministries, was concentrated in two ministries. The Ministries of Automobile and Tractor Industry, of Machine and Instrument Building, of Agricultural Machine Building, and of Machine-Tool Building were merged into a Ministry of Machine Building headed by Party Presidium member M. Z. Saburov, who was relieved as Chairman of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan). The Ministries of Transport Machinery Building, Shipbuilding Industry, Heavy Machine Building, and Construction and Road-Machine Building were amalgamated in a Ministry of Transport and Heavy Machine Building under V. A. Malyshev. Malyshev is the one person in this group who is not a member of the new Party Presidium. He was, however, a member of the Presidium elected by the 19th Congress, and has been, unlike Saburov, closely identified with machinery construction. Malyshev was People's Commissar of Heavy Machine Building from 1939-1940, head of the Tank Industry Commissariat from 1941-47, which was converted to the Commissariat of Transport Machinery Building at the end of the war, and Minister of Shipbuilding Industry from 1950 to the present. He addressed the 19th Congress as the Party's specialist in machine building, particularly construction machinery.

Finally, production of electric power and power equipment was placed in the hands of Party Presidium member M. G. Pervukhin, named head of a Ministry of Electric Power Stations and Electrical Industry, formed from a merger of the Ministries of Electric Power Stations, Electrical Industry, and Communications Equipment Industry. Pervukhin is experienced in the power field, through his service as People's Commissar for Electric Power Stations and Electrical Industry in 1939-1940 and Chairman of the Economic Council for Fuel and Electricity from 1940-1943. In 1942-50 he was Minister of Chemical Industry. Like Saburov and Malyshev, he long functioned as a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers though not a member of the Politburo. The only other non-Politburo Deputy Chairman, I. T. Tevosyan, not mentioned in the March 6 announcement, probably still heads up the important Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy.

Since all of these men were Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers and all except Saburov were known to be responsible for supervision of the spheres of activity which they now head up, the

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reorganization represents very little change in the leadership of the central apparatus. These top officials are now, however, publicly responsible for spheres of government of affairs, and the clarification eliminates any possibility of ambiguity in the chains of command in the most important sectors of the economy. It is possible that when the Party feels the emergency has passed these top Party officials will again relinquish their strictly governmental activities, and the ministries may even eventually be redivided.

Other governmental matters treated in the decree were of relatively minor importance. The recommendation that Voroshilov be elected Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet probably represents appointment to a largely honorary position of an old and venerated Party faithful who has lost much of his influence in the inner circle. The transfer of N. M. Pegov from the Party Secretariat to the position of Secretary of the Supreme Soviet Presidium appears to be a demotion as is also the drop to the position of deputy secretary of A. F. Gorkin, whose decreasing prestige was already noted when the 19th Congress failed to elect him to the Central Committee.

These appointments, as well as the reorganizations of the ministries and the naming of new ministers, will all be dutifully rubber-stamped at the forthcoming meeting of the Supreme Soviet, set for March 14 by the same decree. The session will probably also discuss and approve the Fifth Five-Year Plan and, possibly, this year's budget; duties the Constitution places upon the Supreme Soviet.

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PART IV: THE PROBLEM POSED BY THE STALIN LEGEND

The death of Stalin has created a void not only in the circle of Soviet leaders but also in the realm of Soviet symbols. This latter will be impossible to fill for some time to come. The assiduously-developed Stalin myth and failure to develop a comparable myth about any other living Soviet leader will make it hard to replace Stalin in the public mind. It seems likely that Malenkov will have to operate for some time in the shadow of Stalin, not as a separate embodiment of wisdom. Such a situation has its galling aspects for any dictator, whose ego may be thwarted and whose peace of mind is less secure as long as he cannot present himself as the indispensable man. In spite of the difficulties inherent in a transfer of dictatorial powers to lesser individuals, the population as a whole as well as the bureaucracy may be expected to acquiesce in the selection of a new leader and conform to his dictates.

Popular Attitude Toward Stalin

The popular attitude toward Stalin has been extremely difficult to assess in view of the isolation of the Soviet population. In general there seemed to be a widespread acceptance of him merely because he was there. Many of the people did not associate their troubles directly with his person. Among certain segments of the population, chiefly the youth, there may have been a feeling of genuine respect. In some cases this could be based not so much on a belief in the innate wisdom and beneficence of the ruler as on an admiration of his ability to rise to the top. The cunning and artifice which characterized Stalin's ascent to power must be impressive to many Soviet citizens who, as a result of their own experiences, value these qualities as a means of achieving success.

Certain historical events give Stalin a unique position in the minds of his subjects. Chief among these are the roles he played, or is pictured as having played, in the Revolution and during World War II in defeating the Germans. The constant glorification of these and other achievements minimized the part of others. The very fact of Stalin's long uninterrupted rule has not only equated supreme authority with the personality of one man, but has given the Soviet state an aura of stability in the public mind.

Popular Image of Other Soviet Leaders

Most Soviet citizens seem to regard the ruling organs with complete indifference or passive acceptance. The people are aware that actual decision-making power rests with a small group of Party officials, but, except for Stalin, Party organs rather than individual leaders appear to

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be regarded as the chief instruments of power. Other leaders than Stalin do not seem to have particularly caught the popular imagination.

Public knowledge of Soviet leaders is as difficult to gauge as is the attitude toward them. Molotov has been the most widely-known figure on the Soviet internal scene by reason of his long association with Stalin and his responsible positions in the Party and government. In recent years, however, the greater share of publicity allotted to Politburo members other than Stalin seems to have gone to Malenkov. Fragmentary data on nominations to current local elections show that Malenkov's name was proposed for nomination much more often than that of any other candidate, Stalin excepted. Of the areas surveyed, Malenkov was placed in nomination 90 times, Beriya 52 times, Bulganin 36 times, and Molotov 33 times.

Although such evidence is inconclusive, the gap between Malenkov and the others both in terms of frequency and geographic scope of proposed nominations is impressive. An additional factor boosting Malenkov's position in the public eye has been the constant propagandizing of his speech at the 19th Party Congress last October. It is doubtful that many Soviet newspaper-readers or radio-listeners are still ignorant of Malenkov's name or position. Although this does not mean that he is now better known than other top figures, it is reason for his figure to be fresher in the public mind.

Lack of information prevents a clear assessment of the attitudes of the people toward Malenkov and others. Recent Soviet defectors who commented on the subject seemed to anticipate Malenkov as the successor to Stalin. According to these reports he is a good speaker and has some popularity, probably derived from his authoritative position in the Party. Molotov was also mentioned, although some indicated that he was slipping out of the public mind and others tended to regard him as Stalin's puppet. Beriya is apparently not regarded in the same light as the other two. He is associated in the minds of at least a portion of the public with forced labor camps and the security organs, and consequently is respected and feared more than he is liked. Bulganin seems not to be well known to the public. It may be that the present political leadership has less popularity than other Soviet personalities. Several defectors reported, for example, that the military leader Zhukov enjoyed greater popularity than any political leader.

#### The Effect of Stalin's Death on Popular Loyalty

The death of Stalin has apparently engendered considerable emotional reaction among the populace. The feeling of bereavement probably results from the official deification of Stalin which has prevented any other individual from approaching him in stature in the public eye.

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The removal of Stalin, however, probably does not have important implications for the loyalty of the populace. The people's traditional acceptance of authority and the habit of obedience should permit the new leadership to establish its position. In this it will be aided by devices which Stalin used to good advantage and which are now integral features of the Soviet system, particularly the huge propaganda machine and the extensive system of physical and ideological control. The same situation exists with regard to the bureaucracy and the military establishment. Not only do these share many of the popular attitudes toward the problem of leadership, but they have a vested interest in the existing set-up. Assuming no crack-up at the top, they will almost certainly fall into line with such decisions as are transmitted to them and perform whatever actions are required of them.

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